China’s COMAC C919 Strategy vs. Airbus in the 1970s–80s: A Comparative Analysis

China’s approach to marketing the COMAC C919 hinges on aggressive government backing, state-bank financing, and accelerated delivery schedules designed to lure budget and regional carriers in emerging markets. By combining subsidized financing, rapid slot availability, and massive domestic demand, COMAC seeks to erode Western dominance on key routes, build market confidence, and create a parallel commercial aviation ecosystem that could one day rival the Airbus–Boeing duopoly. This article compares China’s plan for the C919 with Airbus’s playbook from the 1970s and 1980s—examining product design, market strategy, and competitive tactics—to assess whether COMAC has a realistic path to replicate Airbus’s success against McDonnell Douglas and other U.S. manufacturers.

Background: Airbus in the 1970s-80s vs McDonnell Douglas / Boeing

Airbus was established in 1970 as a European consortium—an initiative combining national governments and leading aerospace companies (initially Aérospatiale of France and Deutsche Airbus of Germany, later joined by additional partners)—to compete with U.S. manufacturers, particularly Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed.

Airbus initially launched with the A300 in the mid-1970s, followed by the shorter A310. These medium, wide-body twin-aisle aircraft were designed to capture market niches that U.S. manufacturers were not optimally serving. The A300, in particular, was conceived as a two-engine wide-body alternative to compete with McDonnell Douglas’s DC-10 and Lockheed’s L-1011, offering airlines a more economical aircraft to operate.

Key innovations/strategies:

Technological differentiation: Airbus introduced fly-by-wire controls (with the A320 in the mid-80s design phase) which were radical compared to contemporaries.
Subsidies / state backing: European governments gave launch aid, coordinated cross‐border industrial cooperation, sharing of R&D risk across nations.
Offering new product families: Airbus built a product line that could hit multiple segments (wide-body, medium, narrow), expanding options for airlines.
Targeting customers outside the U.S. first, where regulation, national loyalty, or political preferences could favour a European alternative. Getting orders from non-U.S. carriers helped establish credibility.

While McDonnell Douglas had some strong products (e.g., DC-9, MD-80 etc.), it had limits in R&D investment, lacked flexible product family breadth, and ultimately could not match both scale and new technology investment that Airbus (and Boeing) could. Some analyses suggest despite having good products, MD was eventually overwhelmed by their overhead, lack of economies of scale, customer loyalty to larger competitors, inability to innovate as rapidly.

Over time, Airbus carved out enough of a market share, especially as Boeing’s/McDonnell Douglas’s dominance was challenged on innovation, capability, pricing, choice, and eventually scale. McDonnell Douglas was acquired by Boeing in 1997.

Comparison: China’s C919 Strategy vs Airbus’s in the 70s-80s

Now, comparing how China/COMAC’s approach resembles Airbus’s early strategy, and where it diverges, to assess whether history offers COMAC something similar.

Aspect	Airbus (1970s-80s)	COMAC / China (2020s)	Similarities	Key Differences / Challenges

State backing / industrial policy

Strong. European governments pooled resources, provided launch aid, risk sharing, coordinated industrial base.

Also strong. China is investing heavily, has state levers: government orders, financing, diplomatic leverage, policy banks, capacity expansion, export infrastructure.

Both get major advantages via state support: reduced financial risk, ability to scale production, offering favorable financing to customers.

But modern certification, supply chain transparency, geopolitical scrutiny are much tougher. Also, Airbus had natural EU market, less constrained by intellectual property/licensing issues. COMAC must manage export restrictions, global supply chains, regulatory legitimacy.

Targeting niches / gaps in the market

Airbus started with the A300 (wide-body twin-engine) to fill a market gap between existing aircraft, then built out into more segments.

COMAC is targeting the huge gap where demand for single-aisle aircraft is very strong, especially in China and emerging markets. Also variants (high-altitude, extended range) to match specific regional needs.

Similar in using product variants, matching customer needs in underserved markets. Both aim to provide “good enough” product with logistical and economic benefits.

But today’s competition is more intense: Boeing and Airbus have very mature products, tighter fuel/emissions regulation, greater customer expectations re reliability, aftermarket, global support. COMAC has less international proven track record.

Technology / product differentiation

Airbus invested in new tech—fly-by-wire, advanced aerodynamics, newer materials across its product lines. Their designs offered features and efficiencies that were novel.

COMAC’s C919 uses a proven Western engine (LEAP), while building its airframe to familiar design. Some variants (ER, high-altitude). Working gradually toward localization.

Both use credible tech: Airbus brought innovations; COMAC uses well-accepted, proven engines, designs, then will evolve. Both focus on reliability and performance that meet expectations.

COMAC is not yet pushing very radical new technology (e.g. fly-by-wire was more radical in its era). Regulatory and certification risk is higher. Also, its dependency on foreign suppliers and licenses is a vulnerability that Airbus didn’t face to the same extent (though Europe also imported or collaborated).

Domestic demand & guaranteed launch orders

Airbus benefitted from European carriers and governments buying A300/A310, guaranteeing some base demand, helping amortize costs and prove viability.

China has huge domestic demand, government airlines placing large orders, almost captive home market. Also export to Belt-and-Road markets.

Very similar: a strong domestic base is helping drive credibility, scale, learning, risk reduction.

But in Airbus’s time, domestic demand came with fewer geopolitical trade barriers. For COMAC, exporting will face more political and regulatory obstacles (e.g. certification, customer trust). Also domestic market may hide some inefficiencies that must be resolved for global competitiveness.

Cost, price, financing and availability

Airbus could compete with U.S. firms partially by offering competitive pricing, but also by offering product families, ramping production, offering delivery slots and backing via governments.

COMAC appears to use pricing close to incumbents, but emphasizing earlier delivery, financing via policy banks / Chinese lessors, favorable terms, export support.

Clear similarity in leveraging non-price levers (availability, financing, delivery) as differentiators. Both know that airlines care not just about the lowest bid but about risk, total cost of ownership, and delivery timing.

Modern customers are more demanding: fuel & emissions standards, international safety/maintenance certifications, support, parts network. COMAC must match these or risk being sidelined. Supply chain constraints and political risk may increase costs.

Certification & market access

Airbus had to deal with technical certification, especially to get U.S. and other markets, but over time built credibility. Early on, Europe was more insulated. Also, regulatory norms weren’t as globally harmonized.

COMAC must win FAA, EASA, ICAO credibility to break into Western and high-regulation markets. Timelines of 3–6 years or more for EASA certification, for instance.

Did Airbus “Kill” McDonnell Douglas with Better Product & Strategy?

McDonnell Douglas did not fail overnight; it had loyal customers and competent products. But Airbus’s strategy gradually eroded MD’s advantages. Key mechanisms:

Product gaps and non-investment: MD relied heavily on derivatives, aging product lines. Boeing and Airbus invested in newer, more efficient aircraft families. MD lacked a competitive offering in many of the segments that were growing (e.g. efficient narrow bodies, wide-body twins).
Economies of scale: Airbus’s ability to scale production across multiple plants in different countries, share R&D cost, sourcing, allowed lower per-unit costs and ability to invest in new tech. MD’s scale was more limited.
Global market penetration & brand credibility: As Airbus delivered reliably to non-European customers and proved safety & performance, airlines became more comfortable. MD began losing orders to Airbus (and Boeing) as customers demanded the newer features Airbus offered.
Government backing / policy & trade environment: European governments’ willingness to subsume risk and provide launch aid helped Airbus stay in business during early losses, lower costs for airlines, better financing. MD had less of this kind of backing.
Diversification / product family breadth: Airbus moved to cover multiple market segments; MD was more dependent on fewer models. As demand in some segments shifted (e.g. fuel-efficient narrow bodies, twin aisle wide bodies), MD had less flexibility.

Over time, this led to fewer orders, less investment, difficulties with cash flow, eventually making McDonnell Douglas vulnerable to acquisition. Being bought by Boeing in 1997 was the culmination of the erosion of its competitive position.

What Lessons COMAC Could Draw — Is COMAC on that Path?

Reflecting on the comparison, China/COMAC’s strategy has potential, but faces tougher headwinds. Some lessons:

Strong domestic market and guaranteed demand is critical: as with Airbus, COMAC’s home market gives a base, but it must avoid complacency: international customers will judge by reliability and operating cost as much as price.
Product family breadth & continuous innovation: Airbus survived by expanding product lines. COMAC will need to keep updating, variants, possibly pushing into new tech (fuel efficiency, emissions, composites, digital systems) to stay competitive.
Reliability / certification / safety / support infrastructure matter: these are often the bottlenecks. Airlines don’t buy simply on specs; dispatch reliability, maintenance costs, global parts support, pilot training matter hugely. Airbus succeeded by becoming credible in all these.
Availability and delivery speed are powerful differentiators: Airbus gained orders when Boeing/McDonnell Douglas were slow or had capacity constraints. COMAC similarly is betting that backlog for Airbus/Boeing will give it room to offer earlier deliveries.
Financing, industrial policy, state backing help reduce risk: but they can also bring political risk or trade backlash. COMAC will need to carefully manage export regulations, trade diplomacy, and avoid situations where suppliers are blocked or certifications delayed due to politics.
Sustainable margins / cost control: it’s not enough to have lower cost via state support; COMAC will need to drive down production costs, learn curves, scale efficiently, localization of supply, to avoid being perennially under-cut or squeezed.

In many respects, China’s plan for the C919 echoes the early Airbus strategy: strong government support, guaranteed domestic demand, focus on matching incumbent product capabilities closely (rather than overshooting in every metric), offering competitive terms, and using delivery availability & financing as differentiators.

However, the environment is tougher now, global regulations are stricter, customer expectations higher, supply chain complexity greater, and geopolitical risks non-trivial. Whether COMAC can replicate what Airbus achieved — to become a true third major global player able to challenge Boeing & Airbus long-term — depends on how well it navigates these challenges: especially certification, reliability, cost, and trust.

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